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Abstract
In bringing ourselves to the encounter with the experience of others, we bring our bodies with us*and, in doing so, we
are able to resonate not only intellectually but also empathically with the other’s experiences and expressions (which
are given to us both verbally and nonverbally). In remaining faithful to our foundations in phenomenology (Husserl,
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas), we shall talk about taking notice of others from within the relational ‘‘exchange’’
and reflect upon what, precisely, are the experientially given ‘‘affairs’’ to which Husserl invited us to return. Our interest
begins with the other’s ‘‘first person’’ experience, but since we cannot access this directly, we must rely on the resonance we
find within ourselves, within our own lived bodies, when we are addressed by the other, whether in word or in gesture.
I am wondering what the other is experiencing and all my powers of perception are driven toward this other, whose first
person experience remains just out of reach and accessible only insofar as I have this capacity for a deeper ‘‘bodily felt’’
awareness in which the other’s experience takes possession of me. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bearing ‘‘witness’’ to behavior
is useful in illuminating this ‘‘second person’’ perspective, which takes its point of departure from Husserl’s (1910 1911)
intersubjective reduction, by means of which we ‘‘participate in the other’s positing’’ (1952/1989, emphasis added) and
thereby grasp the meaning of the other’s expression. Ultimately, the intuitive talent of the caring professional will be
shown to reside in his or her being able to move beyond what the other is able to say to a more deeply felt attunement to
what is being revealed to us in the other’s presence. Applications to patient care are discussed.
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Toward a phenomenology of second person
perspectivity
There is no trait of the face which does not receive its
meaning from that primitive witchcraft we have called
‘transcendence.’ (Sartre, 1939/1974, p. 71)
Everything I have that is most secret goes into this
visage, this face. (Merleau-Ponty, 1961/1964a, p. 167)
Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to
words takes place already within the primordial face to
face of language. (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 206)
Phenomenology of the lifeworld has informed caring
science by offering an appreciation of the ‘‘first
person’’ experience of patients to complement the
impartial ‘‘third person’’ perspectives that otherwise
dominate medical discourses about individuals in
treatment. Helping health care professionals to
become more mindful of the unique experience of
patients, ‘‘human science,’’ ‘‘caring science,’’ and
‘‘nursing science’’ researchers have been paving the
way for better treatment approaches that in turn
engender better outcomes for a wide spectrum of
medical and psychiatric disorders.
Although we will be drawing from phenomenolo-
gical sources to illuminate the discussion of what we
are calling ‘‘second person’’ awareness, the ultimate
aim of this paper is for readers to be able to tap
into their own ‘‘lived experience’’ in order to better
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need of care. While one finds in the literature of
psychotherapy plentiful elucidations of the ‘‘we-
experience’’ within which therapists form impres-
sions of their clients’ experience, there is still need
for a more phenomenological clarification of this
bi-personal field to help us explore this special but
everyday mode of access to the experience of others.
Psychology seems to have begun as a discip-
line whose target was first person experience, but
it quickly degenerated into strictly speaking third
person approaches to the individual (Churchill,
2006). Eventually Merleau-Ponty would, in his essay
on ‘‘The Film and the New Psychology,’’ offer the
perspective of ‘‘a witness of behavior’’ as a fruitful
alternative to introspection as a mode of access to
lived experience. He observed:
We must reject that prejudice which makes ‘inner
realities’ out of love, hate, or anger, leaving
them accessible to one single witness: the person
who feels them. Anger, shame, hate, and love
are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of
another’s consciousness: they ...exist on this face
or in those gestures, not hidden behind them.
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1964b, pp. 52 53).
At first I thought of this, insofar as it was his way
of characterizing the camera that photographs an
actor in a film, as a phenomenologist’s way of
reaffirming the value of a third person perspective.
Later, I would come to realize that the perspective of
the camera, like that of a witness of behavior, is not
confined to the third person (indifferent, distant)
perspective but is also capable of the ‘‘up close
and personal’’ perspective that might more properly
be referred to as ‘‘second person perspectivity’’*as
when one is addressed by the other in the face-to-face
encounter. We can tell a lot about others if we can
look deeply into their face; this works quite well
for us when we are watching a film, but we do not
always find in everyday life such intimate access
to other people’s faces, unless we are already in a
close relationship with them.
In articulating my phenomenological approach
to the question of second person perspectivity,
I will be looking at this experience from both sides
in order to try to capture the reversibility that lies
at the foundation of the experience.
1 This means
that I will be considering each participant in the role
of both first and second person. I will also acknow-
ledge the alienation from the second person that
occurs at moments when, in the context of profes-
sional work, we must shift into the third person
perspective (as when discussing a patient in a case
conference or team meeting*or worse, talking
about them as though they were not there when
they are sitting right in front of us).
Among the challenges for phenomenology is the
crucial one regarding how do we break from the
‘‘first person singular experience’’ (which trapped
Descartes inside his cogito) in order to encounter
others in the world? I call this a challenge, because
phenomenology is generally ‘‘done’’ in the first
person singular, even if it necessarily presupposes
the first person plural, which is to say that we ‘‘find
ourselves’’ living in a world with others. (Indeed,
phenomenology always begins and ends in the first
person plural, since our research interests are drawn
from our own social realities, and our research
findings are presented to an intersubjective context
for verification and critique.)
One might say that the second person perspective
itself emerges when we first engage the other person
as a ‘‘you’’*which usually occurs at the moment
that we first address (or are addressed by) the other,
either as a speaking or non-speaking subject. In this
sense, the study of the we-relationship, and of the
second-person experience within that relationship,
constitutes the first step in a social ecology of human
experiencing that has its roots in our bodily being
together*more specifically, in the resonance that
occurs when our bodies meet. (See Churchill 2001
and 2007 for descriptive illustrations).
When we invoke Merleau-Ponty’s (1964/1968)
notion of the reversibilities of the flesh, we are
able to appreciate the ‘‘both/and’’ of our reciprocal
roles as first and second persons ‘‘within’’ the we
experience, rather than slipping ambivalently into
the ‘‘either/or’’ dichotomy that one finds in Sartre’s
(1943/1956) brilliant analyses of polarized ‘‘subject-
object’’ relations (love, hate, shame, fear, pride,
and sado-masochism). It was Merleau-Ponty who,
following Husserl’s lead, gave us a clue on how
to break the circuit of solipsism: ‘‘it is precisely
my body which perceives the body of another, and
discovers in that other body a miraculous prolonga-
tion of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing
with the world’’ (1945/1962, p. 354).
If the first person plural (Husserl’s ‘‘intersubjec-
tivity’’) is always already the backdrop for first
person singular reflections (namely, his ‘‘transcen-
dental reduction,’’ which opens the field to ‘‘trans-
cendental subjectivity’’), we must remember that
Husserl (2006) posited early in his career, in his
winter semester lectures of 1910 1911 (which he
alternatively referred to as his ‘‘Intersubjectivity
Lectures’’ or ‘‘Empathy Lectures’’)
2 that within the
reduction is given not only my own ego and its
positings but also the other ego and its positings
(Section 36, p. 79). In other words, Husserl pointed
us in the direction of what has been called an
S. D. Churchill
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It is this Ineinander or Verflechtung (Husserl) that
serves as ontological ground for experiences such
as das Einfuehlen wherein we have a bodily ‘‘felt
sense’’ (Gendlin, 1978 1979) of the other’s experi-
ence. We call this experience ‘second person’ aware-
ness in recognition of the fact that it is not simply
reducible to my first person singular experience: I
am not simply engaging in a ‘‘reasoning by analogy’’
(wherein I would be making cognitive assumptions
about the other’s otherwise private experience).
Husserl’s technical use of the term ‘‘empathy’’ [die
Einfuehlung] can be differentiated from the earlier
use of the term by Vischer (1873/1994) and Lipps
(1903/1935)
4 and is also very different from current
day psychotherapeutic usage of the term. For
Husserl, it meant ‘‘the act by which we [perceive]
another and therefore another self-awareness on the
basis of its bodily presence-in-the-world’’ (Husserl
1910/2006, Translator’s Preface, p. xxvi). According
to ‘‘the twofold manner of the phenomenological reduc-
tion,’’ there is ‘‘the uncovering of other phenomen-
ological I’s through a doubled phenomenological
reduction’’ in which, first, our own experience of
empathy in itself is subjected to ‘‘viewing’’ [die
Erschauung]; and, second, we may also practice the
phenomenological reduction in regards to the em-
pathized consciousness of the other, whom we are
witnessing (p. 84).
Then all phenomenological being is reduced, on
the one hand, to one (to ‘‘my’’) phenomenological
I that is distinguished as a perceiving, remember-
ing, and empathizing I, being at the same time
the phenomenologically reducing I, and, on the
other hand, to other I’s, posited in empathy,
and posited as looking, remembering, and perhaps
[even] empathizing I’s. (Husserl, 1910 1911/
2006, p. 86).
What is essential about empathy is [firstly] that ...
[it] goes beyond the stream of consciousness of the
ego to present the other pure ego and its stream of
consciousness through appresentation, and [sec-
ondly] that the being of this stream ...is a being
that is ‘‘in itself and for itself and conceived
through its own being’’ (p. 164).
Most of the time, scientific phenomenological
researchers are not studying their own acts of
empathy but rather the individual psychological
lives revealed by their empathizing acts. This is why
we can, following Schutz (1962), say that we are
then conducting phenomenological research within
the natural attitude (that is, we do not make a
transcendental turn toward our own empathizing
consciousness) while at the same time accomplishing
a phenomenology of the natural attitude (that is,
performing a psychological reduction on the self-
report data provided by our research participants).
All of this, of course, sounds very technical; but
what does it really come down to? Are these
procedures described by Husserl intended only for
the transcendental philosopher?
Let us take a closer look at what he is saying:
in an appendix to the same winter lecture course,
Husserl (1910/2006) wrote: ‘‘... there are, besides
the perception of bodies, the perception of animals
and the perception of human beings too, i.e., that
which I rather poorly called ‘empathy’, or some-
what better, ‘empathizing perception’’’ (p. 164).
What Husserl has designated here as an ‘‘empathiz-
ing perception’’ [einfuehlende Wahrnehmung], we
might refer more simply to as second person
perspectivity*for then it seems more obvious: It is
a lived bodily experience in which a ‘‘felt sense’’ of the
other’s ‘‘interiority’’ (namely, my resonating with the
other’s intentionality) is given to me spontaneously, in a
‘‘passive genesis’’ of meaning.
Even this characterization is still too formal: the
important thing here is that it is a perceptual moment,
within my encounter with the other, in which I feel
present to the other’s soul. We do not always feel
present to other’s soul when we are passing people
on the street; it is, rather, in the up-close moment of
contact where the other looks me in the eyes, and
where we move beyond the momentary glance,
holding the gaze, and studying each other’s face for
signs of expression. In such moments, when the
other looks back at me, I can feel a deeper sense of
their attunement*something that Heidegger (1972)
called ‘‘Mitbefindlichkeit’’ (p. 162). This is a ‘‘shared
attunement,’’ in which I come to know something
about the other, even if I cannot yet put it into
words.
5 And yet, according to Heidegger, we can
experience this shared attunement when the other
attempts to communicate his or her experience
to us: ‘‘Sie [die Mitteilung] vollzieht die Teilung der
Mitbefindlichkeit und das Versta ¨ndnisses des Mitseins’’
(Heidegger, 1972, p. 162). What is key to this
passage is that he tells us not only an understanding
of our being together gets communicated but also,
equiprimordially, we ‘‘find ourselves’’ [sich befinden]
‘‘tuning in’’ to a shared mood or disposition.
6
This ‘‘empathizing moment’’ within second
person perspectivity is something that happens to
us all the time, but we do not think about it,
because we do not always put this moment of
perception into words. It often remains ineffable,
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spoken by the patient (or by the research participant,
or by the person addressing us on the street).
Only later do we reflect back to ourselves,
‘‘hmmm, I found myself with tears forming in my
eyes as the patient was describing that difficult
moment of her experience,’’ and then I wonder if
she might have been feeling sad as well? In our
encounters with patients and research participants,
we are often gathering preverbal (and therefore easy
to overlook) ‘‘data.’’ If we are taught as both
researchers and practitioners to be both observant
and reflective, then we should start paying closer
attention to such moments in which others are
revealing themselves to us (see Churchill, 2010).
If we were to only ever adopt a third person
perspective, such as the behaviorist does, then
the other’s first person experience would remain
opaque to us. If, alternatively, we attempt to
‘‘adopt’’ the other’s first person perspective in our
imagination, then we remain ultimately within our
own framework. Merleau-Ponty reassures us, in the
Phenomenology of Perception, that:
In reality, the other is not shut up inside my
perspective of the world, because this perspective
itself has no definite limits, because it slips
spontaneously into the other’s, and because both
are brought together in the one single world in
which we all participate as anonymous subjects
of perception. (1945/1962, p. 353).
The unsatisfactory alternatives of dispassionate third
person and imaginative first person perspectives
can be transcended when I allow myself to resonate
with the other: such as when I am the second person
whom the other addresses.
What I am acknowledging in the current formula-
tion is that second person perspectivity is a special
mode of access to the other that occurs within the
first person plural: in ‘‘experiencing the other within
the we,’’ we are open to the other as a ‘‘thou,’’
another ‘‘myself’’*at the same time, I am able to
appreciate that at this same moment I become an
intimate ‘‘Other’’ to the one with whom I find myself
in an ‘‘exchange.’’ Thus, the secret to understanding
second person perspectivity is realizing that it works
in both directions at the same time, and always within a
‘‘we-relation.’’ In principle, we must acknowledge
that the we-relation, which serves as context for the
experience that I am describing here, does not have
to be a face-to-face relationship ‘‘in the flesh’’*even
if the most profound experiences of empathy are
more likely to come out of the interpersonal en-
counter. What about when we are reading a hand-
written letter from a friend that is addressed to us?
Do we not experience the other’s living presence in
this form of expression? Why is it that I can be
moved to tears when I pick up one of my mother’s
handwritten letters to me? Is it not because in being
addressed by her, even from afar, I feel myself
present to her living intentionality? Is it not her loving
me, her first person experience while she was writing
me the letter*that I am ‘‘viewing’’ (to use Husserl’s
preferred term erschauen) when I read her words? Is
not the meaning of her words precisely the love that
she was so clearly experiencing and manifesting in
her act of writing? Finally, is not her intentionality,
which alone was capable of animating her words, the
very object of my empathizing perception?
So then, how are qualitative data, written for the
researcher in answer to an access question, different
in principle from a letter from my mother?
In principle, they are alike, except for the difference
in the intensity of emotion that I might feel while
allowing the other’s intentionality to come into
view. When during a seminar, I digress into a
personal anecdote and find myself moved in the
telling of the story, I find my eyes watering up, and
almost immediately, I notice tears forming in the
eyes of some of my students. Is this just some simple
reflex triggered by ‘‘mirror neurons?’’ Or, is it rather
an adventure in the reversibilities of the flesh, where
the others who are bearing witness to me find
themselves moved by my own intentionality?
In all of these examples, the one who is witnessing
the other, whether through the other’s handwriting
or storytelling, becomes present to the psychological
dimension of the other. It is this dimension that
I referred to earlier as a ‘‘living intentionality,’’ as
in the ‘‘loving intentionality’’ of my mother. It is
this dimension to which Merleau-Ponty (1960/1961)
referred in his ‘‘Preface to Hesnard’’ when he
stated, ‘‘phenomenology and psychoanalysis ...are
both aiming toward the same latency (p. 87).’’
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We become present to this latency when we openly
receive the words and expressions of others.
Caring for others: Implications of second
person perspectivity for health care
professionals
If first person research inquiries make us better
aware of the interior perspectives and private con-
cerns of both patients and caring professionals, the
second person perspective is one that can illuminate
the ways in which we as observers have a direct
access to the meaning of others’ experiences without
having to go through the intermediary of first
person reports. This is especially important when
the other is unable to speak for herself; but, it is
nonetheless a valuable ‘‘tool’’ in all health care
S. D. Churchill
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appreciation of the aptitude that we all have as living
persons to engage directly with others, to perceive
meaning directly in human expression, and to
be able to grasp intuitively what the other needs
from us.
It is not so much a question of having to
‘‘decipher’’ the other’s expressions as to simply live
in them: the German word Nacherleben implies a
kind of ‘‘lived experience’’ or ‘‘co-experiencing’’ that
brings us closer ‘‘toward’’ an understanding of
others. Dilthey used this term to describe our means
of access to higher forms of understanding other’s
experiences of life (1927/1977). Husserl thought of
such experiences as facilitating ‘‘a kind of reflection’’
(eine Art der Reflexion) wherein the other’s experience
and mine are together part of an open system in
which a ‘‘reversibility’’ of our lived bodies enables a
mirroring where (to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty) the
other’s gestures furnish my own intentions with a visible
realization.
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Within the phenomenological starting point
of the Ineinander and Verflechtung (in contradistinc-
tion to the Cartesian cogito), I find myself open to
experiencing meanings in the other’s expressions
that are not ‘‘my own’’ (first person) meanings but
rather belong to the (second person) realm of the
other, such as when reading my mother’s letters.
Thus, the meanings that I experience are properly
grasped as the other’s meanings (or perhaps ‘‘our’’
meanings) and not simply my own. We are speaking
of second person awareness whenever we become
aware of the other’s intentionality within a commu-
nicative exchange. It refers to my consciousness of
the other when the other is addressing me: what
is it that I learn about you when you look me in
the eyes and appeal to me as caregiver?
My interest is of course in your first person
experience, but since I cannot access this directly,
I must rely on the resonance I find within myself, within
my own lived body, when I am addressed by you.
What do I feel called to do by the other? This ‘‘feeling
called’’ can be described (in diagnostic language) as
‘‘secondary’’ to the experience of the one who calls
me to care and protect. In the ‘‘selfless’’ attitude of
the caregiver, the other becomes of primary impor-
tance, the first person of concern. I am wondering
what she is experiencing, and all my powers of
perception are driven toward this other, whose
first person experience remains just out of reach
and yet accessible insofar as I have this capacity of
second person awareness, in which the other’s joy
or despair or pain or sadness resonates in me. Insofar
as I recognize it as the other’s experience rather
than my own, it belongs to the second person realm.
Without my witnessing the other’s experience
(whether addressed directly to me or expressed in
close enough proximity for me to become a part of
the ‘‘field’’ within which the other’s experience takes
place), I would only be making guesses about the
other’s experience, possibly distorted by ‘‘projective
identification’’ or ‘‘sympathy’’ or ‘‘inference.’’ But
when I am a true witness of the other’s experience,
I am entering into that vibrant field in which
meanings, originating in the other, become a spon-
taneous upsurge in my own experience.
9 We con-
sider this to be a privileged mode of access to the
other insofar as the other addresses us with his or
her gaze, invites us to respond, to be attentive, and
calls us to understand.
When the schizophrenic girl shouted obscenities
at us (we, the orderlies and nurses, who were about
to subdue her and carry her down to the seclusion
room), she was not talking about someone else
(i.e., about those evil hospital workers who do not
really care about you); she was addressing us
directly, calling us her oppressors, forcing us to
take stock, if only for a moment*and demanding
that we take responsibility for our actions toward
her. As long as we allow ourselves to remain as third
persons, we do not really listen to the ravings of
the psychotic*nor do we really take responsibility
for what we are doing (because, after all, we are
only carrying out orders). Bureaucracy must main-
tain anonymity in its (third person) dealings with
others, in order to avoid ‘‘favoritism’’ and other
concessions that might come about if a real sense of
responsibility were to become the basis for the
relationship of the bureaucracy to the people it
serves (Berger, Berger, & Kellner, 1973).
The psychotic’s behavior might sometimes be
nothing more than a stubborn insistence that
he/she be taken seriously and that we who deal
with troubled patients acknowledge the personal
relationships we have with them. The stroke patient
who cannot speak nonetheless struggles to lift her
forearm off the bed, balancing on her elbow, gestur-
ing for someone to hold that hand*and, even if she
does not know who it is who is walking around in her
space in the ICU, she is hoping for someone to
become a thou and thereby establish a ‘‘we.’’ The
first person plural simply establishes a plurality of
subjects; it is the second person experience that
puts one in communicative exchange with another
‘‘me’’*with a ‘‘someone who will listen to me.’’
It is within this context of intersubjectivity that we
not only address the other, reaching out to another
subject, but also feel ourselves addressed by the
other even if only by an appeal of the eyes. In this
address, we experience a tacit call to respond, to
assist, to share the moment, to offer help. And, it is
when we find ourselves on the receiving side of this
Resoundings of the flesh
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own gesture is responded to, that I speak of the
second person perspective (because at this moment,
I am the second person relative to your first person).
If I cannot know your experience the way that
you do (if I cannot know the dying person’s pain
the way he/she experiences it), I nonetheless am
able, insofar as I am there with you, to perceive from
this ‘‘second’’ perspective that you are in need of
assistance.
The caregiver must be able to enter into this
more intimate relation of an ‘empathizing percep-
tion’ or second person awareness, in order to antici-
pate the other’s need, to be able to ‘‘leap ahead’’ in
this Heideggerian sense of an ‘‘anticipatory’’ caring
for others (vorausspringende Fuersorge) (Heidegger,
1927/1962, p. 158). When a more ‘‘distant’’ health
care professional enters the room, he/she remains
blind to the other as a person and deaf to the tacit
soliciting of care that is the call of the other. The
food service employee who delivers a food tray to
the rolling table standing across the room from the
patient’s bed*and just leaves the food sitting there
out of reach*is at best merely indifferent to the
other’s condition and, at worst, demonstrating con-
tempt for one’s fellow man. When my mother
suffered strokes as a consequence of pacemaker
installation at a training hospital in New Jersey, the
nursing staff and food service employees did nothing
to assist her in feeding: her meals were routinely
delivered and then picked up, untouched, even after
we had brought this to the attention of the head
nurse on each shift. Was it lack of time? Simple
oversight? Or was it rather a systematic failure of our
health care professionals to care? And wherein lay
the deficit in their training, I wondered? Had caring
been omitted from their job description? If only such
‘‘professionals’’ could have heeded the words of
Levinas (1961/1969), who stated that ‘‘in expression
the being that imposes itself does not limit but
promotes my freedom, by arousing my goodness’’
(p. 200). My siblings and I pulled our mother as
quickly as possible from this hospital where a general
lack of care was apparently the rule rather than the
exception.
I share this anecdote only to indicate what it is
that urgently calls out to the health care provider.
Levinas writes, ‘‘The face opens the primal discourse
whose first word is obligation’’ (1961/1969, p. 207).
If today’s phenomenologists are not yet at home
dwelling reflectively in second person awareness,
it is nonetheless the case that there is a necessary
shift from first person singular to second person
awareness the moment we embark on the task of
an ethics. Even before we engage in our ontological
and ethical reflections, there is an ethos of the social
world itself, which serves as backdrop for all
my actions. Within this ethos, we encounter what
Levinas called ‘‘the face of the other.’’ The other’s
face, for Levinas, is an appeal, a call to action.
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There is a poignant scene in the film The Diving
Bell and the Butterfly where a stroke victim suffering
from ‘‘locked-in syndrome’’ is approached by his
speech therapist, who is teaching him how to
communicate by blinking his eye, to signal which
letter of the alphabet that she is reading aloud to
him is the next letter of the word he wishes to ‘‘say.’’
The scene, which consists of one continuous
shot,
11 looking through his one good eye into the
face of the speech therapist, is a perfect example
of second person perspectivity in its double reversi-
bility. We see her leaning in toward our eye (since
‘‘subjective camera’’ gives to us the physical ‘‘point
of view’’ of the character) and we are able to ‘‘read’’
her emotions as she begins to realize what it is
that he is communicating to her. At the same time,
she is looking from her perspective into his one
open eye, which still serves as ‘‘the window of his
soul.’’ When he begins to spell out ‘‘I want death,’’
she turns away quite dramatically*not from his
physical eye but from the despairing soul that she is
looking into through his eye. As tears form in her own
eyes, her expression turns from welcome receptivity
to a troubled and even angry rejection of his words,
which she calls an ‘‘obscenity.’’ Mediated by the
camera’s POV, we see into her grieving soul as she
looks into his. The eyes are the medium of this
exchange, and neither we nor the speech therapist
are at this moment conscious of our own first person
experience, so much as we are present to the (second
person) experience of the other who is looking into our
eyes. (There is never a dry eye while watching this
scene.)
Bedside care
Fortunately, my family was able to find excellent
caregiving on the part of the individuals whom we
hired to provide both part-time and full-time
care to our mother. Each developed a personal
relation with mother, to the point of doing her
exercises together, watching television together,
and even praying together. When mother could
no longer formulate her own prayers due to her
ongoing strokes, Phoebe*a woman from Kenya
with a remarkable sense of solicitude*would put
her hand lovingly on mother’s forehead, stroking her
hair and face, saying her prayers for her. Mother
in turn could repeat the last words of each of
Phoebe’s phrases, as a way of joining with and
‘‘owning’’ the prayers. They looked into each other’s
eyes, and at the end of the prayer, mother would
S. D. Churchill
6
(page number not for citation purpose)
Citation: Int J Qualitative Stud Health Well-being 2012; 7: 8187 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/qhw.v7i0.8187say ‘‘I love you’’ to Phoebe, and Phoebe would
respond in kind. Then, Phoebe would retire to her
room, after turning on a ‘‘baby monitor’’ so that she
could hear if mother were stirring during the night.
Phoebe engaged in an ‘‘anticipatory’’ mode of care,
not only listening to mother’s appeals but also being
on the alert for any signs of distress.
During her final days, after transitioning to what
the hospice nurses called ‘‘active dying,’’ mother was
immobile, unable to execute movements, and unable
to speak. She was, however, able to express feeling as
when her eyes would fill with tears at the sound of
my father’s piano playing, heard on a cassette tape
placed near her pillow*a recording I had discovered
buried in a drawer from two decades ago. Phoebe
had learned to differentiate these loving tears from
the painful tears that erupted when the morphine
was wearing off (and from the simple leakage of
liquid quite involuntarily from the tear ducts, which
occurred from time to time). This sensitivity on
Phoebe’s part to mother’s almost inaccessible inner
feelings made possible a more humane experience
for mother up to the end.
The suffering she must have endured remains
unfathomable to me. She went without food and
water for all of 9 days before she finally succumbed.
Her last meal was some cinnamon applesauce and
chocolate pudding, which we gave her on Mother’s
Day to cover the bad taste of the morphine, which
I personally administered in liquid form under her
tongue or in the side of her cheek. Each day, another
hospice nurse would come to check her vital signs
and would leave saying that mother had probably
only a matter of hours, at most 2 days. And yet she
hung on. Day after day, night after night, breathing
rhythmically and sleeping eventually with her eyes
open. I would try to moisten her lips with a little
‘‘lollipop sponge,’’ as they were still discolored from
the first time she bit down on them in pain when the
morphine had worn off. Our pastor gathered with us
around her bed, and we held hands while saying
a prayer. I reached under the sheet to take my
mother’s hand. She had been incapable of voluntary
motor movements for several days, and yet when
I reached for her hand I felt her hand clenched*
pulling up the sheet, I saw that her hand was locked
with a tight grip on the bottom sheet and under-pad,
in what could only have been a desperate response
to unimaginable pain. In my own horror at this
realization, I asked mother to blink her eyes if she
could hear me. (My sister had tried this some days
earlier, and it had worked.) She blinked once and
then twice more. I asked if she was in pain and she
fluttered her eyes. Earlier, a nurse had told us we
could stop administering morphine because mother
had seemingly entered a trance-like coma. I then
asked if she would like morphine, and once more her
eyelids fluttered and then closed tightly shut for a
moment, as if to be sure we did not mistake it for a
simple blink. I administered a full dose of morphine
and Phoebe sang a spiritual song to her. Phoebe then
pointed to mom’s eyes and ‘‘mouthed’’ the words
‘‘Crying*she is crying’’ pointing to the tears that
were forming in the corner of her half-shut eyes.
It felt important to be with her there at the end,
to witness her suffering, to be able to respond to
her ever so slight, yet palpable, calling out for care.
Mother was not the kind of person to ask for help, or
complain of pain, or to trouble anyone for anything.
When convalescing at my sister’s home the year
before, confined to a wheelchair or walker, she
would ask if she could get anyone a glass of water,
when it was she who was thirsty! Her requests were
hardly requests at all*they were always offers to
provide care for others. How easy it had become
to think of mother as self-sufficient. One month
before she died, she said to me, ‘‘I can’t wait till
I can be independent again and take care of every-
thing for myself.’’
In the end, her greatest gift was allowing us
to care for her. This meant stepping out of our
own self-preoccupied first person experience and
sitting alongside her bed during those last weeks
in which she never left her bed. The previous
autumn she had turned to me from that same bed
and with tears forming in her eyes, said, ‘‘I hope you
know I’ll always be in your corner.’’
I can only hope that at the end, she was able
to feel that we were there for her, in her corner.
Closing
Yes, the secret to understanding second person
perspectivity is realizing that it works in both direc-
tions at the same time. It is built upon the phenom-
enon of reciprocity, in which we experience the true
miracle of intersubjectivity.
Merleau-Ponty (1960/1964d) wrote in ‘‘The Phi-
losopher and His Shadow,’’ ‘‘others and my body
are born together from the original ecstasy’’ (p. 174).
This ecstasy refers to that special moment within
‘‘first person plural’’ experience when we experience
the call to step out of ourselves to enjoin the other
in a simple moment of being-with. Sometimes this
moment can be experienced in silence, as when
I was sitting by my mother’s side. At other times, it
can be a communicative dance, an exhilarating
exchange, as in my encounters with the bonobo.
Either way, when I experience myself as being
addressed by the other, when I am pulled into the
other’s field, I am simultaneously pulled out of my
own solipsism into the resoundings of the flesh.
Resoundings of the flesh
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Notes
1. In my earlier treatment (Churchill, 2006) of this perspective,
I started out with the usual linguistic distinctions: with ‘‘ﬁrst
person’’ referring to my stance as thinking subject, ‘‘second
person’’ referring to your position as the one I am addressing,
and ‘‘third person’’ referring to the person ‘‘over there’’ whose
behavior I may be observing at a distance. I then reversed
the usual (linguistic) use of ‘‘persons’’ in order to accommo-
date the psychologist’s interest*not in his or her own
experience, but rather that of the patient, the client, the
research participant. Thus, we might say that, in the psycho-
logical application of second-person perspectivity, the psy-
chologist is positioned as second person relative to the indi-
vidual whose ﬁrst person experience is the object of concern.
In my role as second person, I have become the vehicle,
or better, the instrument, of the other’s expression. ‘‘Suddenly
there breaks forth the evidence that yonder ... life is being
lived: ... another private world shows through, through the
fabric of my own, and for a moment I live in it. ... [And
ﬁnally,] my private world has ceased to be mine only; it is now
the instrument which another plays ... .’’ (Merleau-Ponty,
1964/1968, p. 11 as quoted and edited by Rosan, 2012.).
2. Most exciting about this book is that it introduces Husserl’s
ideas on empathy and intersubjectivity long before much of
his writing on these topics began to appear in print in the
mid-1920s. This shows that Husserl was concerned very
early on with these themes; while he does not deliver as much
as one might like in these directions, he at least sets
the stage for the direction that others have taken with his
work (most notably, Merleau-Ponty). His discussion here of a
‘‘double reduction’’*and of the givenness of the experience of
the other within one’s own reduced sphere of consciousness*
contributes greatly to an English-speaking readership’s under-
standing of a thinker who is often associated exclusively with
his Cartesian-friendly ‘‘egological reduction.’’.
3. See Zahavi (2001) for an illuminating discussion of Husserl’s
approach to intersubjectivity; see Thompson (2001) for a
collection of essays from a wide array of scholars, all focused
on some aspect of ‘‘second-person issues’’ in the study of
consciousness.
4. See Rosan (2012).
5. Merleau-Ponty does more than just put it into words; he
memorializes the moment in a moving tribute: ‘‘Vision ceases to
be solipsist only up close, when the other turns back on me the
luminous rays in which I had caught him, renders precise that
corporeal adhesion of which I had a presentiment in the agile
movements of his eyes, enlarges beyond measure that blind spot
I divined at the center of my sovereign vision, and, invading my
ﬁeld through all its frontiers, attracts me into the prison I had
prepared for him and, as long as he is there, makes me incapable of
solitude.’’ (1964/1968, p. 78).
6. See Heidegger (1987/2001, pp. 80 112) for elaboration of
the problem of method in understanding others, in its relation
to the problem of the body and of the ‘‘bodying forth’’ [leiben]
of both myself and the other within a communicative
exchange.
7. The fuller statement is worth considering for its dramatic
effect: ‘‘...it is by what phenomenology implies or unveils at
its limits*by its latent content or its unconscious*that it is in
consonance with psychoanalysis.’’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1960/
1961, p. 86) ‘‘Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not
parallel; much better, they are both aiming toward the same
latency.’’ (p. 87).
8. Concretely, ‘‘when I say that I see someone, it means that I am
moved by sympathy for this behavior for which I am a witness
and which holds my own intentions by furnishing them with a
visible realization’’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/1964c, p. 93). As a
mirror - ‘‘a sort of reﬂection’’*I re-enact the other’s behavior
by vesting in the other’s stance, gesture, expression a lived
understanding of human intentions that constitutes my pre-
sence to the world. This ‘‘re-enacting’’ or ‘‘co-performing’’,
which others have referred to as ‘‘imitative empathy’’ (Allport,
1937; Lipps, 1903), does not require any reﬂective effort on
our part for it is what characterizes our ‘‘natural experiential
attitude’’ toward others. ‘‘I know unquestionably that man
over there sees, that my sensible world is also his, because Ia m
present at his seeing,i tis visible in his eyes’ grasp of the scene’’
(Merleau-Ponty, 1960/1964d, p. 169). This natural stand-
point would be the essential basis for all experiences of other
people, and thereby for any conclusions we might draw about
others in our personal (as well as professional) lives.
9. In his presentation at the Oxford Conference, Peter Rosan
(2012) presented vignettes of empathy and stated: ‘‘These
vignettes represent variations on the theme of the subject as
an engaged participant, indeed as an instrument, attuned and
thereby illuminating an interiority, the other’s as well as his/her
own, not otherwise accessible had the subject remained a
dispassionate or neutral observer of the other’’ (emphasis
added). This is really quite brilliant: ‘‘attuned and thereby
illuminating’’ *as if to say that our ontologically disclosive
powers (our powers to illuminate, to ‘‘logos’’) are themselves
derived from our embodied attunement to others. In addition,
Rosan’s observation*that the interiorities illuminated belong
both to myself as perceiver and the other as perceived*points
in the direction of a foundation for all of Husserl’s claims
regarding the intersubjective realm: this would be the very
matrix of the aforementioned ‘‘double reduction’’ whereby we
become present, in the reduction, to not one but two
intentionalities: mine and that of the other whose experience
I am ‘‘viewing.’’
10. Feeling connected ethically to other sentient beings indeed
transcends interhuman relations as we enter into interspecies
communication. At a North American zoo, a man observed
JoJo, an adult male chimpanzee, slide down an embankment
into the moat separating the chimpanzees from the human
observers. And seeing that the chimpanzee could not swim
and was slipping under the water, he did something quite
remarkable: incredibly, he climbed over the barrier, entered
the water, andpushed the chimpanzee back to safety all amidst
the cries and screams from the onlookers who observed several
adult males with hair on end approaching from the side of the
enclosure. Once more fearing the worst, the human onlookers
could only seem to expect that the other chimpanzees, and
possibly even JoJo himself, would only intend to hurt the man,
unable to recognize his heroic act as anything but a threat.
JoJo, exhausted from the ordeal, slipped once more into the
water and the man turned around, again amidst the screams
coming from the growing crowd, and once more pushed JoJo
to safety. Later, the director of the Jane Goodall institute,
Hans Cole, called the man on the phone and said, ‘‘That was a
very brave thing you did. You must have known it was
dangerous, everybody was telling you. What made you do
it?’’ And the man replied ‘‘Well, you see, I happened to look
into his eyes and it was like looking into the eyes of a man, and
the message was ‘won’t anybody help me?’’’ (Jane Goodall,
personal communication, May 18, 2005).
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